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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Paul Ezra Rhoades ("Rhoades") appeals the district court's
Order dismissing his successive Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing.
Specifically, Rhoades challenges the district court's order denying his motion to amend
his petition with two additional claims.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings And First PostConviction Relief Case
Denying Rhoades federal habeas relief, the federal district court recently detailed
the facts leading to his convictions for the first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping,
robbery, rape and infamous crime against nature of Susan Michelbacher as follows:
Early in the morning of March 19, 1987, Susan Michelbacher was
feeling ill and decided to take the day off from her job as a special
education teacher in Idaho Falls. She left home around 6:30 a.m., telling
her husband that she intended to drop off her lesson plans at school and
then return home to rest.
Around 7:30 a.m., Valerie Stapf was looking for a place to park in
a grocery store parking lot when she nearly collided head-on with a large,
amber-colored van very similar to the one Michelbacher was driving that
morning. Two people were sitting in the front seat. Stapf was never able
to identify the driver, other than to note that it was a young woman who
was similar in appearance to Susan Michelbacher, but Stapf would later
testify that the passenger - whom she described as having long dark hair
and being "real big, real kind of rough and dirty looking" - was Paul
Rhoades, the Petitioner in this case. The female driver and Petitioner
appeared to be agitated, and after a short stand-off, the van backed up and
drove toward a bank at the far end of the parking lot.
As soon as the bank opened, the van pulled up to the drive-in
window. The teller recognized Michelbacher, who presented her with a
check already made out for $ I ,000, which the teller cashed. Within a
matter of minutes, Michelbacher arrived at a different drive-in branch of
the same bank and again cashed a check for $1,000.

That same day, Susan Browning was preparing to leave her
residence in a rural area west of Idaho Falls when she observed this same
amber-colored van coming to a stop on the shoulder of the highway,
blocking her driveway. Browning claimed to see three people in the van,
one of whom she later positively identified as Petitioner. She would also
identify the other two individuals as Harry Burke, Petitioner's cousin, and
Teresa Rhoades, Petitioner's sister, but she did not see anyone who
matched Susan Michelbacher's description. After a few minutes, the van
drove away. Two other witnesses would come forward and claim to have
seen Petitioner, or someone matching his appearance, either driving or
riding in the Michelbacher van.
The van was discovered the next day in the same grocery store
parking lot in which Valerie Stapf saw it the day before, but with an
additional 150 to 200 miles on the odometer and a scratched exterior.
Long brown hair consistent with Petitioner's hair was discovered inside.
On March 21, Michelbacher's body was found in a remote area
west ofldaho Falls. She had been raped, shot nine times, and her assailant
had also ejaculated in her mouth, either as she was lingering near death or
after she had already died. According to a State's serological expert,
Petitioner could not be excluded as a source of the semen that was
retrieved from the body, while Harry Burke and Michelbacher's husband
could be excluded.
The next day, when Petitioner arrived at an acquaintance's house
with a large amount of cash, he remarked that he had just "come into some
money" and was on his way to Jackpot, Nevada to gamble. A few hours
later, he was spotted at a gas station between Idaho Falls and Jackpot,
again with a roll of cash. Also around this time, Petitioner's mother,
Pauline Rhoades, reported to police that her green Ford LTD had been
stolen.
On March 24, two truck drivers saw the Rhoades vehicle parked on
a highway median in northern Nevada. A person matching Petitioner's
description hurriedly exited the car, fumbled with something brown in his
hands, and then jogged off into the sagebrush. A highway patrolman who
responded to the accident scene found a .38 caliber handgun laying on the
ground near the open door of the car, and ballistics testing would soon
confirm that this weapon had fired the bullets that killed Michelbacher.
Idaho authorities were notified that Pauline Rhoades' s car had
been discovered, and officers proceeded to Nevada armed with a warrant
for Petitioner's arrest for an unrelated burglary. Once there, they
processed the car for evidence and found, among other items, ammunition
that matched the typed used in the homicide.
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The day after Petitioner abandoned his mother's car, Nevada law
enforcement officers arrested him while he gambled at a casino in Wells.
Idaho officers Victor Rodriguez and Dennis Shaw arrived shortly
thereafter, and as they approached, Petitioner blurted out, "I did it." Upon
hearing this, Rodriguez read Petitioner his Miranda warnings. After
Petitioner had been transported to a highway patrol substation for
processing, Detective Shaw mentioned that if he had arrested Petitioner
sooner, three murder victims might still be alive. Petitioner responded to
this comment by again saying, "I did it."
Rhoades v. Arave, 2007 WL 951897, *1-2 (D. Idaho 2007).
On March 29, 1987, a complaint was filed charging Rhoades with Susan's firstdegree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery, rape, infamous crime against nature and
sentencing enhancements.

(#17437, R., pp.1-3.) 1 On July 2, 1987, the state filed a

supplemental discovery response disclosing the forensic testing that had been completed:
Don Wycoffs report relative to materials heretofore examined by
him will be presented by July 13, 1987, additional reports maybe [sic]
forthcoming as they relate to additional examinations of additional
materials not heretofore examined. A report and additional witnesses will
be forthcoming upon our receipt of the test results from a FBI Seriologist
[sic]. These materials were submitted on June 2, 1987 and we expect
them shortly. This submission to the FBI of a semen sample was done
after consulting defendant's attorney Stephen Hart.
(#17437, R., p.162.) The response further detailed the items previously disclosed by the
state (#17437, R., pp.162-68), and explained:
The foregoing materials have been provided in addition to the
basic reports which have also been supplied. To the best ofmy knowledge
the above constitutes the entire contents of our file on State v. Paul E.

' The state has filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice, asking this Court to take judicial
notice of Rhoades' underlying cases and various other pleadings relied upon by the
district court. Therefore, the state will refer to those records and transcripts by their
respective Idaho Supreme Court docket numbers. The supreme court docket number for
Rhoades' underlying trial and sentencing is #17437. The supreme court docket number
for his first post-conviction case is #18039. The supreme court docket number for
Rhoades' instant appeal is #34236. The supreme court docket numbers for Rhoades'
second successive post-conviction case and I.C.R. 35 motion are ##32897/32898.
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Rhoades. However, if you have any questions or concerns regarding what
you view to be inadequate disclosure please feel free to contact me at our
office at anytime. In addition, please be advised that our file will be at
your disposal for review and inspection on July 13, 1987, at the hour of
I 0:00 o'clock a.m. Photocopy facilities are available should you find any
materials you wish to copy. If and when additional materials or reports
come within our possession or our knowledge and control, we will make
these available forthwith.
(#17437, R., pp.167-68.)

Rhoades has never alleged he did not receive the F.B.I.

serologist report as promised by the state.
Rhoades filed a Motion and Order Requesting an Appointment of Expert Forensic
Criminologist seeking the appointment of criminologist Richard Fox to "review and
testify with regard to the blood, semen, hair and other trace evidence as well as ballistic
testing and so forth," which the district court granted. (#17437, Tr., Vol.I, pp.214-25.)2
Rhoades filed a motion asking that the state be required to provide various items of
forensic evidence for independent testing, including semen samples taken from Susan's
mouth. (#17437, R., pp.189-91.) Rhoades also sought an order requiring the state to list
all physical evidence in its custody that had not been tested (#17437, R., pp.295-96),
which, pursuant to the state's stipulation, was granted by the district court (#17437, Tr.,
Vol.II, p.386). The motion was renewed (#17437, R., pp.324-26) and, when questioned
by the district court, the prosecutor expressly agreed Rhoades' expert had been provided
the "substantial equivalent of what [was] sent to the FBI." (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.420).

2

The state has scoured the Clerk's Record for Rhoades' written motion, but has been
unsuccessful in locating the motion. Likewise, a formal written order is not contained in
the Clerk's Record. However, it is clear from the transcript Rhoades filed a written
motion and it was granted by the district court. For example, On November 30, 1987,
Rhoades filed a responsive pleading stating, "As experts in this case, the defense intends
to call Richard H. Fox, Sr. at the address noted on Attachment 'A' to present evidence
dealing with ballistics, serology, hair and trace sampling, and the related forensic
evidence." (#! 7437, R., p.412.)
4

As a result of a hearing, the district court found there had been substantial compliance
with its prior order and the "vast majority of the materials have been provided." (#17437,
Tr., Vol.II, p.432.) Rhoades was subsequently ordered to require Fox to return the
forensic items to the state. (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.566.) In addressing the payment of
experts, the district court also noted, "These scientific, technical and other experts have
analyzed the evidence and assisted the defense in ballistics, serology, laboratory studies,
fingerprinting and other scientific areas." (#17437, R, p.447.) For tactical reasons,
Rhoades chose to not have Fox testify at trial. (#17437, Tr., Vol.III, pp.634-36.)
A jury found Rhoades guilty of Susan's first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping, robbery, rape and infamous crime against nature. (#17437, R., pp.623-27.)
In March 1988, the district court sentenced Rhoades to death. (#17437, R., pp.714-37.)
In May 1988, Rhoades filed a Request for Post Conviction Procedure Under
Idaho Code Section 19-2719. (#18039, R., pp.1-2.) After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied Rhoades post-conviction relief. (#18039, R., pp.249-72.)
In a consolidated appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Rhoades'
convictions, death sentence and the district court's denial of post-conviction relief. State
v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1991).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Rhoades' Current Successive Post-Conviction Relief
Case
In 1993, a Statement of Issues Re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in
federal court on behalf of Rhoades. (#34236, R., p.172.) Rhoades' initial Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed in 1994. (#34236, R., p.172, Dkt. 3.) After completing
discovery, Rhoades filed an amended federal habeas petition. (#34236, R., p.177, Dkt.
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76.) Rhoades moved to further amend his federal habeas petition (#34236, R., p.182,
Dkt.154), but the federal district court denied that portion of his motion seeking to add
new facts to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim (#34236, R., p.183, Dkt. 174). On
March 28, 2007, the federal district court denied Rhoades habeas relief, see Rhoades v.
Arave, 2007 WL951897; his appeal is pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On June 28, 2002, while litigating his federal habeas case, Rhoades filed his
current Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing, seeking testing of evidence
collected at the time of Susan's murder; no specific claims challenging his conviction or
sentence were raised in the petition. (#34236, R., pp.5-10.) The state filed a timely
answer. (#34236, R., pp.14-17.)
On July 29, 2005, Rhoades filed a Motion to Amend Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief (#35346, R., pp. l 06-08), seeking to add two additional claims, both based upon
the F.B.I serologist report (#34236, R., pp.129-39). Based upon an affidavit from his
new expert witness, Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. (#34236, R., pp.148-51), Rhoades contended
in the first new claim (Count Two) that the F.B.I. report itself "exonerated Petitioner of
the rape in the Bonneville capital case" and that the state failed to advise Rhoades'
attorneys "of the exoneration," failed to correct the state's expert's trial testimony and
"exaggerat[ed]" the expert's testimony during closing argument (#34236, R., pp.132-37).
In the second new claim (Count Three), Rhoades contended, based upon the F.B.l. report
and Dr. Hampikian' s affidavit, that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was
convicted. (#34236, R., pp. 138-39.) The state filed an objection asserting the two claims
are procedurally barred under LC. § 19-2719 because they were known or reasonably
could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition. (#34236, R.,
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pp.158-63.) The state further asserted Rhoades failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact under the UPCPA because he failed to establish the state (1) withheld exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), because the F.B.I. report
was actually provided to his attorneys prior to trial, or (2) knowingly used perjured
testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). (#34236, R., pp.16667.) Finding Rhoades' case and motion to amend were governed by I.C. § 19-2719, the
district court denied his motion because the new claims were known or reasonably could
have been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition; the court declined to
address the state's alternate argument under the UPCP A. (#34236, R., pp.211-17.)
On March 6, 2007, Rhoades withdrew count one of his Petition for PostConviction Scientific Testing, but noted the district court's denial of his motion to amend
and his intent to appeal that ruling. (#34236, R., pp.219-21.) Based upon his motion, the
district court dismissed Rhoades' petition on March 16, 2007.

(#34236, R., p.222.)

Rhoades filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 26, 2007. (#34236, R., pp.223-27.) 3

'Rhoades also filed another successive post-conviction petition and an I.C.R. 35 motion,
contending his death sentences are unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (##32897/32898, R., pp.4-13), which the district court dismissed (##32897/32898,
R., pp.262-67). This Court granted the state's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded Rhoades' case for
"further consideration in light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. ---, 128 S.Ct. 1029,
169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008)." Rhoades v. IdalJO, --- U.S.---, 128 S.Ct. 1441 (2008).
7

ISSUES

Rhoades has stated the issues on appeal as follows:
(1) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's
motion to amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the prosecutorial
misconduct claims until he consulted an expert out of an abundance of
caution, and even though neither trial defendants nor post-conviction
petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of prosecutorial
misdeeds, absent notice of their existence;

(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's
motion to amend even though Petitioner had no notice of the factual basis
of the actual innocence claim, and even though neither trial defendants nor
postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of
actual innocence; and
(3) Whether denying Petitioner who presented a prima facie claim of
actual innocence leave to litigate that claim even though he may not
otherwise have met the timeliness requirements ofldaho Code Section 192719( 5)( c) violated his right to bring such claims pursuant to Idaho Code
section 4901(a)(4) [sic] and whether it violated his rights against cruel and
unusual punishment and to due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the
Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 and 13; and Sivak v. State, 134
Idaho 641, 642 8 P.3d 636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the
State requests would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain
evidence of actual innocence in successive post-conviction petitions, even
where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed by
prosecutorial misconduct.").
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
Prior to trial Rhoades was provided a copy of the F.B.I. serologist's report and an
expert to review and independently test the forensic evidence collected during the
investigation of Susan's murder. Because Rhoades failed to make a prima facie showing
that the two claims he desired to add to his Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific Testing
were not known or could not reasonably have been known when he filed his first postconviction petition, is this Court deprived of jurisdiction to hear this appeal?
Alternatively,
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Because the two additional claims were known or reasonably could have been
known when he filed his first post-conviction petition, has Rhoades failed to establish the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to amend?

9

ARGUMENT

I.
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Hear Rhoades' Appeal Because The Two Claims
In His Motion To Amend Were Known Or Reasonably Could Have Been Known When
He Filed His First Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
The two claims Rhoades wished to add to his successive petition are both based

upon the F.B.l. serology report and Dr. Hampikian's affidavits. Rhoades contends the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to amend because he was not
"duty-bound to search for prosecutorial deceit and other misdeeds absent notice of its
existence" (Appellant's brief, p. I 0) and there was "no ... evidence putting him on notice
that the prosecution elicited false testimony from its forensic expert, that the FBI testing
exonerated Petitioner, and, therefore, that the prosecutor failed to correct either its
forensic expert's false testimony or his grossly misleading testimony" (Appellant's brief,
p.13).
Idaho Code § 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar if the two claims Rhoades
desired to add to his successive petition do not meet the stringent requirements of LC. §
19-2719(5).

Because Rhoades has failed to make a prima facie showing that the

additional claims fit within the narrow exception provided by I.C. § 19-2719(5), this
Court is without jurisdiction to review the merits of his appeal requiring that it be
dismissed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently explained, "When faced with a motion to

dismiss an appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2719, 'the proper standard of review this
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Court should utilize is to directly address the motion, determine whether or not the
requirements of section 19-2719 have been met and rule accordingly."' Row v. State,
145 Idaho 168, ···, 177 P.3d 382,384 (2008) (quoting Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573,
575, 51 P.3d 387 (2002)).

C.

Rhoades' Successive Post-Conviction Petition And His Current Appeal Are
Governed By LC.§ 19-2719(5)
Idaho Code § 19-2719 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures

in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post-conviction
proceedings which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act
(UPCP A), are civil in nature and governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995). Idaho Code§ 19-2719 does
not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but acts as a modifier and
"supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions conflict." McKinney v. State,
133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144 (1999); Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 470.
Specifically, LC. § 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to raise
all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition which
must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho .
795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in LC. § 19-2719(5),
which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it can be demonstrated
that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known within
the time frame allowed by the statute." Id., 120 Idaho at 807. If a capital defendant fails
to comply with the specific requirements of LC. § 19-2719, including the specified time
limits, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[t]he courts of Idaho shall
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have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any
such relief" J.C.§ 19-2719(5); McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700.
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief has
a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised in that
petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at
471. Even if the petitioner can demonstrate the claims were not known or could not
reasonably have been known, LC. § l 9-2719(5)(a) details the additional requirements that
must be met before the successive petition may be heard:
An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be
heard because of the applicability of the exception herein for issues that
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not be
considered unless the applicant shows the existence of such issues by (i) a
precise statement of the issue or issues asserted together with (ii) material
facts stated under oath or affirmation by credible persons with first hand
knowledge that would support the issue or issues asserted. A pleading that
fails to make a showing of excepted issues supported by material facts, or
which is not credible, must be summarily dismissed.
LC.§ 19-2719(5)(a).
Finally, LC.§ 19-2719(5)(b) explains that a successive post-conviction petition is
"facially insufficient" if it merely alleges "matters that are cumulative or impeaching or
would not, even if the allegations were true, cast doubt on the reliability of the conviction
or sentence."

If evidence is merely cumulative with evidence already within the

possession of the defense at the time the first petition for post-conviction relief is filed, a
procedural bar exists mandating dismissal of the successive petition. Sivak v. State, 134
Idaho 641, 647-49, 8 P.3d 636 (2000).
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If the petitioner fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in LC. §
19-2719(5), the petition must be summarily dismissed.

Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)

specifically provides:

If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section
and within the time limits specified, he shall be deemed to have waived
such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably should have been
known. The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any such
claims for relief as have been so waived or grant any such relief.
(Emphasis added); see also Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 289-90, 17 P.3d 230 (2000).
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the Idaho Supreme
Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of LC. § 19-2719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences."
The statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by
requiring that all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one
proceeding .... " We hold that the legislature's determination that it was
necessary to reduce the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational
basis for the imposition of the 42-day time limit set for l.C. § 19-2719.
The legislature has identified the problem and attempted to remedy it with
a statutory scheme that is rationally related to the legitimate legislative
purpose of expediting constitutionally imposed sentences.
The United States Supreme Court has specifically approved requiring a criminal
defendant to present all of his collateral claims in a single post-conviction proceeding. In
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court, discussing federal habeas corpus
proceedings which prohibit piecemeal litigation by requiring that all claims be brought in
a single petition for a writ of habeas corpus, explained the respective states can employ a
similar procedure for post-conviction relief procedures. The Court concluded:
There can be no doubt that States may likewise provide, as Maine
has done, that a prisoner seeking post-conviction relief must assert all
known constitutional claims in a single proceeding. Indeed, the Court of
Appeals agreed that the Maine statutory scheme was an "orderly
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procedure of the state courts," as that term is used in Fay v. Noia, [372
U.S. 391, 438, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849, 9 L. Ed. 2d 837 (1963)]. No prisoner
has a right either under the Federal Constitution or under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
to insist upon piecemeal collateral attack on a presumptively valid
criminal conviction in the face of such a statutory provision.
Id. at 45-46.
Idaho Code § 19-2719 also has a great deal of interplay with federal habeas law.
The ability of a state to ensure its judgments carry a measure of finality rather than being
subject to repetitive federal attack depends in substantial measure on the regular and
consistent enforcement of state procedural rules and bars.

Addressing the interplay

between state procedural bars and federal review, the Supreme Court, in Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988), refused to honor a state procedural bar,
explaining:
[W]e consider whether that bar provides an adequate and independent
state ground for the refusal to vacate petitioner's sentence. "[W]e have
consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in
compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a
federal question is itself a federal question." Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443, 447, [85 S. Ct. 564, 567, 13 L. Ed. 2d 408] (1965). "[A] state
procedural ground is not 'adequate' unless the procedural rule is 'strictly
or regularly followed.' Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, (84
S. Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L. Ed. 2d 766] (! 964)." Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457
U.S. 255, 262-263, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 2426-2427, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982);
see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. at 447-448, 85 S. Ct. at 567-568. We
find no evidence that the procedural bar relied on by the Mississippi
Supreme Court here has been consistently or regularly applied. Rather,
the weight of Mississippi law is to the contrary.
The Idaho Supreme Court has historically followed the requirements of I.C. § 192719, strictly and regularly dismissing successive capital post-conviction relief appeals
because of petitioners' failure to meet the narrow exception of LC. § 19-2719(5). See

e.g., Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 51 PJd 387 (2002); Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257,
32 PJd 151 (2001); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 21 P.3d 895 (2001); Rhoades v. State,
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135 Idaho 299, I 7 P.3d 243 (2000); Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (1996);
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Lankford v. State, 127 Idaho 100,
897 P.2d 991 (1995); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); Fetterly v.
State, 121 Idaho 417, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991). The court has also historically followed the
requirements of l.C. § 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts'
dismissal of successive capital post-conviction claims because of petitioners' failure to
meet the narrow exception of I.C. § 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of
I.C. §§ 19-2719(5)(a) and (b). See Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230 (2000);
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8
P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (1999).

D.

This Court Should Dismiss The Instant Appeal Without Addressing The Merits
Of Rhoades' Motion To Amend
As noted above, a capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-

conviction relief has a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that
issues raised in that petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute."
Pizzuto, 127 Idaho at 471; see also McKinney, 133 Idaho at 701. If a petitioner fails to
make the requisite showing, "The courts of Idaho shall have no power to consider any
such claims for relief." Idaho Code § 19-2719(5). In Fetterly. 121 Idaho at 419, the
court recognized the petitioner's failure to raise the issues in his first petition for postconviction relief resulted in a waiver of the issues. As a result, the court dismissed the
appeal. Id. In Paz, the petitioner filed a motion to stay execution after the district court
dismissed his second petition for post-conviction relief. Shortly thereafter, the supreme
court ordered the respective parties to simultaneously file briefs addressing the question
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of whether there were new grounds for post-conviction review.

After reviewing the

briefing and hearing oral argument addressing only the jurisdictional issue, the Idaho
Supreme Court dismissed Paz's appeal. Id., 123 Idaho at 758-60.
In Lankford, 127 Idaho at 101, the state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
alleging Idaho Code § 19-2719 barred consideration of the petitioner's successive
petition. After reviewing the claims asserted in the successive petition and the supporting
documents, the court concluded Lankford "failed to assert any claim not barred by LC. §
19-2719," and dismissed his appeal. Id. at 102.
By dismissing a petitioner's appeal from the denial of a successive petition for
post-conviction relief, this Court sends a clear message to the federal courts of its intent
to consistently apply the procedural bar associated with LC. § 19-2719 and that the basis
for the decision is the procedural bar, not federal law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722 (1991). The Supreme Court has recognized, "It is not always easy for a federal
court to apply the independent and adequate state ground doctrine."

Id. at 732.

However, when this Court explicitly invokes the state procedural bar, the state decision is
based upon an independent and adequate state rule even if the Court alternatively
addresses the merits of a federal claim. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. IO (I 989).
When this Court's opinions addressing successive post-conviction petitions do not "fairly
appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law," it cannot be
presumed the court based its decision on federal law.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735.

However, when, as in Coleman, this Court "state[s] plainly it [is] granting the [state's]
motion to dismiss the ... appeal," at 740-41, the federal courts recognize the Court's
application ofl.C. § 19-2719 and that it is an independent and adequate state bar.

16

Alternatively, this Court can affirm the district court's decision, even on a
different basis. Pierce v. State, 142 Idaho 32, 34, 121 P.3d 963 (2005). For example, in
McKinney, 133 Idaho at 708, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of a successive
petition, concluding, "McKinney has waived the following issues under I.C. § 19-2719
because he either actually knew them, or reasonably should have known them, at the time
he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief." In Sivak, 134 Idaho at 644-45, the
court affirmed after concluding, "The State's prosecutorial misconduct in allowing
Leytham's false testimony at trial to go uncorrected was an issue which reasonably
should have been known at the time of Sivak's first petition." In Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at
797, the court affirmed after concluding, "Since the withheld information of which
Pizzuto complains in this successive petition would have been used only to impeach the
testimony of Rice and Odom, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the third
amended petition for post-conviction relief."
Because, as detailed below, Rhoades has not made a prima facie showing that the
claims he desired to add to his successive petition comply with the dictates of I.C. § 192719, his appeal must be dismissed or, alternatively, the district court must be affirmed.

E.

The Two Claims Rhoades Desired To Add To His Successive Petition Do Not Fit
Within The Exception Of I.C. § 19-2719(5)
The withholding of evidence by a prosecutor from the defense that is favorable to

the accused, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith, violates due process if the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87,
(1963). Under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Supreme Court explained the
state cannot obtain a conviction through the use of evidence that is known to the state to
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be false. "The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence,
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id. at 269.
However, as explained in McKinney, 133 Idaho at 706-07, "Even if the State
violated [Rhoades'] right to due process by withholding evidence, [Rhoades] was
required to raise this issue, like other constitutional issues, within the time frame
mandated by I.C. § 19-2719." See also Porter, 136 Idaho at 261. In a successive petition
for post-conviction relief, Rhoades must "make the required prima facie showing that the
issues could not reasonably have been known during the first proceeding." McKinney,
133 Idaho at 707. Therefore, the court must "initially examine[] whether the information
alleged by [Rhoades] to be exculpatory reasonably should have been known at the time of
[Rhoades'] first post-conviction petition." Porter, 136 Idaho at 261.
The two claims Rhoades wished to add to his successive petition are both based
upon the F .B.I. serology report, which, according to Dr. Hampikian, "did absolutely
exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen" and "this is a complete exclusion,
and the FBI report contained a clear unqualified conclusion." (#34236, R., pp.125, 127.)
However, these claims were known or reasonably could have been known when Rhoades
filed his first post-conviction petition.
As detailed above, Rhoades has never contended the state failed to provide him a
copy of the F .B.I. report upon which Dr. Hampikian bases his conclusion, only that he
recently retained Dr. Hampikian who has rendered an opinion different from that of the
state's expert, Donald Wyckoff. The first indication that the F.B.I. was testing forensic
evidence was on July 2, 1987, discussed in the state's supplemental discovery response,
which reported, "A report and additional witnesses will be forthcoming upon our receipt
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of the test results from a FBI Seriologist [sic]. These materials were submitted on June 2,
1987 and we expect them shortly. This submission to the FBI of a semen sample was
done after consulting defendant's attorney Stephen Hart." (#17437, R., p.162.)
Not only did the state provide Rhoades a copy of the report, he was also provided
the expert forensic criminologist of his choosing, Richard Fox, to "review and testify
with regard to the blood, semen, hair and other trace evidence as well as ballistic testing
and so forth."

(#17437, Tr., Vol.I, pp.214-25.) Fox was provided the "substantial

equivalent of what [was] sent to the F.B.I." (#17437, Tr., Vol.II, p.420.) Rhoades has
completely failed to establish Fox not only was provided the F.B.I. report, but the
forensic evidence to review and complete any additional testing.
In one of Dr. Hampikian's subsequent affidavits, he opined:
The analysis I conducted was generally, perhaps universally,
accepted by the community of forensic biologists as well as the
community of forensic serologists in 1987. Further, once the FBI
completed its testing and thereby determined the values of the PGM
alleles (the plus and minus characteristics), whether Mr. Rhoades was a
potential contributor of the semen was not a matter of interpretation or
opinion. Any forensic scientist with expertise in PGM analysis would
have reached the same conclusion as I did in my June 20, 2005, affidavit.
The FBI PGM testing absolutely excluded Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of
the semen.
(#34236, R., p.198.) In another affidavit, Dr. Hampikian further opined:
Additionally, and to further clarify my December 12, affidavit, the
kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my
June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally accepted by forensic
biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic tool known
to and employed by forensic experts in investigating offenses where
evidence containing body fluids might help uncover a perpetrator's
identity. The kind of analysis I employed using the FBI PGM subtyping
testing results was, in 1987, on a par with similar uses of blood typing
results ....
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.... The results reported by the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to
Ms. Marcum were clear, unambiguous, and used a standard reporting
language that would be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic
biologist of the day.... This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic]
from being the donor of the semen sample found on the victim which was
typed as PGMsub I +. Furthermore, there is no indication in the FBI
report that this finding could be an artifact, or that there was any evidence
of a mixture in the sample.
The standard and universally accepted
conclusion in 1987 (as today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhodes
[sic] does not match the questioned semen sample (Q 1) taken from the
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of the semen
sample Ql.
(#34236, R., pp.201-02.)
Based upon the state having provided the F.B.I. serologist report to Rhoades prior
to trial and Fox having been appointed by the district court to review the report and
forensic evidence, the two additional claims Rhoades desired to add to his successive
petition were clearly known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his postconviction petition, particularly in light of Dr. Hampikian's opinion that any forensic
expert in 1987 would have reached the same conclusion based only upon the F.B.I.
serologist report. However, even if Fox did not review the report, Rhoades was provided
a copy of the report and could have retained Hampikian or some other expert during his
first post-conviction case to ascertain whether the F.B.I. report was susceptible to a
different interpretation than the opinion provided at trial by the state's experts.
Rhoades' reliance upon Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000), is
seriously misplaced. As detailed above, the F.B.I. report and the appointment of Fox to
review the forensic evidence clearly provided Rhoades the opportunity to establish
whether the F.B.I. 's testing actually exonerated Rhoades. Dr. Hampikian's affidavits
clearly establish his opinion is based upon the report itself. Therefore, Sivak actually
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supports the state's position that Rhoades' claims were known or reasonably could have
been known when he filed his first post-conviction petition.
Rhoades' reliance upon Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990), is
also misplaced. Not only did the report and Fox's appointment provide Rhoades with the
tools necessary to raise the two additional claims, but Stuart was based upon the UPCP A,
not the limitations of LC.§ 19-2719. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807 n.l, 820 P.2d
665 (1991) ("It must be noted that Stuart was not decided pursuant to LC. § 19-2719.
This statute was not cited by either Stuart or the State.").
Rhoades further contends, "Affirming the lower court's denial will close the door
to Petitioner who has proffered a prima facie case of actual innocence.

Denying

Petitioner the ability to litigate his prima facie claim would violate his rights. . . ."
(Appellant's brief, p.18.) However, this Court has never established an exception to the
limitations of LC. § 19-2719(5) based upon a claim of "actual innocence." Rather, the
authority upon which Rhoades relies is premised upon federal habeas law, not LC. § 192719; there is no exception for an alleged claim of"actual innocence" under Idaho law.
Further, Rhoades' contention that he has established a "prima facie case of actual
innocence" is greatly exaggerated. Not only does he ignore the circumstantial evidence
presented by the state, particularly ballistics testing, but he ignores the fact that he
withdrew his first claim in the instant petition and refused to disclose the results of the
DNA testing that was conducted. Additionally, in denying Rhoades federal habeas relief,
the federal district court examined Dr. Hampikian's opinion in the context of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and noted that Dr. Hampikian has subsequently
admitted his previous affidavit contained a typographical error and "acknowledges that
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the FBI's result could be based on the victim's contribution to the swab." Rhoades, 2007
WL 951897, *32. Addressing this issue, the court explained:
Petitioner has not indicated how an opinion similar to Dr.
Harnpikian's would have materially assisted the defense at trial. Certainly
trial counsel could not have argued that the report exonerated petitioner,
because there is apparently no way of knowing whether it is the second
possibility - the victim's own tissue sample on the swab - that accounted
for the result. Further, co-counsel Stephen Hart covered this possibility
extensively during his cross-examination of Mr. Wyckoff, at least as it
pertained to the State lab's result.

Addressing the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
court further explained:
[E]ven if the State's general serological evidence were eliminated, the
other incriminating evidence remained strong, including the ballistics,
hairs found in the van and on the victim's body, the "I did it" statements,
Petitioner's possession of the murder weapon, eyewitness accounts that
placed him in the van, and his unexplained windfall of cash immediately
after the homicide.
As a result, this Court concludes that there is no reasonable
probability of a different outcome had Petitioner's counsel developed and
presented an opinion of the FBI report similar to the one now proposed by
Dr. Harnpikian.

Because Rhoades has failed to make a prima facie showing that the information
upon which he bases his two additional claims was not known or reasonably could not
have been known when he filed his first post-conviction relief petition, his appeal must
be dismissed.
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II.
Rhoades Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Motion To Amend Because The Two Additional Claims Were Futile
A.

Introduction
Should this Court determine it must address the merits of Rhoades' Motion to

Amend, the district court's decision denying his motion must be affirmed because the two
additional claims are futile. Not only were the claims barred by LC. § 19-2719(5),
Rhoades failed to establish the state violated Brady, by withholding exculpatory
evidence, that the state knowingly used perjured testimony in violation of Napue, or that
he is actually innocent.

B.

Standard Of Review
Because post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P.3d 820 (2000), Rhoades' motion to
amend his post-conviction petition is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a). "The denial of a
plaintiffs motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of action is governed by an
abuse of discretion standard of review." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn
Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, ---, 177 P.3d 955,959 (2008) (quoting Est. of Becker
v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527, 96 P.3d 623 (2004)).

C.

Rhoades' Two Additional Claims Are Futile
Because the state had already filed an answer, Rhoades could not amend his

petition without "leave of court" or "written consent of the adverse party." I.R.C.P.
15(a). While "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires," I.R.C.P. 15(a), the
district court still had discretion to deny a motion to amend. Black Canyon Racquetball
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v. First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900 (1991). The Idaho Supreme Court
has explained:
In determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed,
where leave of court is required under Rule 15(a), the court may consider
whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the
amended complaint state a valid claim. Bissett v. State, 111 Idaho 865,
869, 727 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Ct. App. 1986) ("The record which was before
the trial court contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle
Bissett to the injunctive relief he claims. In addition, Bissett has failed to
state on appeal any additional allegations which would establish a cause of
action. . . . We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to allow amendment of Bissett's complaint.") If the amended
pleading does not set out a valid claim, or if the opposing party would be
prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim, or if the opposing party
has an available defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the amended
complaint.

Rhoades has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by refusing
to add the prosecutorial misconduct claims because the state had "an available defense
such as a statute of limitations." As detailed above, Rhoades' prosecutorial misconduct
claims are barred by LC. § 19-2719, thereby making those claims futile.
Additionally, even if the claims were not barred by LC. § 19-2719, they are futile.
Admittedly, the withholding of evidence by a prosecutor from the defense that is
favorable to the accused, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith, violates due
process only if the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at
87. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 678, 682 (1985), the Supreme Court examined
the issue of "materiality" by looking at Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
and concluded, "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability, that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
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been different.

A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome." Id. at 682. Additionally, it is clear that Brady applies to
impeachment evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675-76.
To establish a prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon perjured testimony,
Rhoades was required to present sufficient evidence to prove the prosecutor obtained a
conviction "by the knowing use of perjured testimony." Paradis v. State, 1 IO Idaho 534,
538, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976))
(emphasis added). If Rhoades makes such a showing, the conviction "must be set aside if
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony would have affected the
judgment of the jury." Id. "This standard is a 'strict standard of materiality not just
because [these cases] involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because
they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process."' Id. (quoting
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104).
As discussed above, the state did not withhold evidence.
serologist report was provided to Rhoades prior to his trial.

Rather, the FBI

Neither has Rhoades

provided any evidence that the state withheld evidence that was not detailed in the report.
Further, Rhoades has provided no evidence that the state was aware of any opinions
contrary to the state's expert's opinion. Rhoades has merely provided the affidavit of a
newly hired expert who has offered an opinion different than the opinion offered by the
state's expert, clearly distinguishing his case from Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004),
in which the state was actually aware of exculpatory evidence and false testimony.
Finally, as detailed above, albeit in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the federal district court has already determined Rhoades has failed to meet
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Brady's materiality standard by concluding he failed to establish prejudice under
Strickland. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (equating the prejudice
inquiry under Strickland with the materiality inquiry under Brady).
Likewise, as detailed above, Rhoades' "actual innocence" claim is unavailing.
Rhoades failed to establish either federal or Idaho law permits the filing of a freestanding
"actual innocence" claim. The Supreme Court has never found a constitutional violation
based only upon a freestanding actual innocence claim. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 400 (1993), the Court explained, "Claims of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief
absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceedings."

As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "actual innocence" is "not itself a

constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass
to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Majoy v.
Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 n.l (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,315
(1995)); see also Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 673 (9 th Cir. 2002); Coley v.
Gonzales, 55 F.3d 1385, 1387 (9 th Cir. 1995) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993)). Other circuits have also adopted this analysis. See, e.g., Lafevers v. Gibson,
238 F.3d 1263, 1265 n.4 (10th Cir. 2001); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5 th
Cir. 2000); Mansfield v. Dormire, 202 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (8 th Cir. 2000). Recently, the
Supreme Court once again declined to address the question of whether a freestanding
claim of actual innocence is cognizable in federal habeas in capital cases, determining
even if such a claim existed, the petitioner had failed to meet his burden. House v. Bell,
547 U.S. 518, 554-55 (2006).

26

Likewise, Idaho appears to have rejected the idea of a freestanding "actual
i1mocence" claim. In Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 520, 975 P.2d 1181 (Ct. App. 1999)
(emphasis omitted), the court distinguished Schlup, in part, because the petitioner's claim
was "substantive rather than procedural. Hays does not allege that there is an underlying
constitutional violation that resulted in his conviction."
Even if a freestanding actual innocence claim is recognized, Rhoades has failed to
meet the test articulated in Schlup. As explained by the Supreme Court:
To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in
light of the new evidence. The petitioner thus is required to make a
stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice. At the same
time, the showing of "more likely than not" imposes a lower burden of
proof than the "clear and convincing" standard required under Sawyer.
Id. 513 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In Schlup, the Court made several observations regarding the actual innocence
standard. First, in assessing the adequacy of a petitioner's showing, the court is not
bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. "Instead, the emphasis on
'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of
relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial." Id. The reviewing
court makes its determination "in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence
tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after
the trial." Id. at 328.
Second, the reasonable doubt standard is not discarded. Rather, "the analysis
must incorporate the understanding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt marks the legal
boundary between guilt and innocence." Id.
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Third, the standard is not based upon the mere showing that reasonable doubt
exists in light of the new evidence. Rather, the Court explained the standard is:
[T]hat no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not
the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt
exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district
court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of
the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 329.
Finally, the Court highlighted the word "reasonable," noting, "It must be
presumed that a reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented. It
must be presumed that such a juror would conscientiously obey the instructions of the
trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this standard "is not easy to meet,"
Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002), and is "narrow" in scope,
Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, "[t]o be credible, a claim
of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial." Id. at 982.
Because such evidence is rare, "in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence
has been summarily rejected." Id. Further, the Eighth Circuit has concluded not only
must the evidence be new because it was unavailable at trial, the petitioner must establish
it could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Amrine
v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8 th Cir. 1997); Morris v. Dormire, 217 F.3d 556,559
(8 th Cir. 2000); see also Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 533 (4th Cir. 2003).
Based upon the Schlup standard, Rhoades has failed to establish actual innocence.
As noted above, the federal district court has previously addressed the F.B.I. serologist
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report and Dr. Hampikian 's conclusion in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel
and determined Rhoades failed to establish prejudice.

Rhoades v. Arave, 2007 WL

951897, *31-33. Because the Schlup actual innocence standard is even more difficult
than the Strickland prejudice standard, Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327, Rhoades has failed to
establish "actual innocence."
The evidence in this case was simply overwhelming, and merely because Rhoades
has found a new expert who has provided another interpretation of the F.B.I. report
regarding the semen found in Susan's mouth does not establish "actual innocence."

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that Rhoades' appeal be dismissed or, alternatively,
that the decision of the trial court be affirmed on appeal.
DATED THIS 5th day of June, 2008.

Deputy Attorney eneral and
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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